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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Thomas LaMar Dewsnup, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
Bailey's Moving and Storage 
Company, a corporation, and 
Allied Van Lines, a corporation, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
Case No. 14408 
REPLY BRIEF 
of 
APPELLANT BAILEY'S MOVING AND STORAGE COMPANY 
Appellant replies to Respondent's Brief in the following 
particulars. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent commences his recitation of facts by stating that 
he does not agree with appellant's Statement of Facts, either as 
to relevancy or accuracy. Relevancy may be in the eye of the 
beholder, but appellant challenges the allegation that the facts 
cited by it are not accurate. It is noted that Respondent's Brief 
points out no inaccuracies, but merely alleges a conclusion. It 
is also significant to note that respondent does not contend that 
the Abstract of Transcript prepared by appellant is not an accurate 
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summary of the testimony at trial, but in fact refers to the same 
without qualification. { 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE VERDICT 
i 
The "opinion" of plaintifffs expert, Mr. Wildey, was based on 
the premise that a tortion bar came "partly out to the point where 
one side only was secured to the bracket, giving only one shear 
plane" (Tr. 245) and respondent in his Brief cites the fact that 
Arnold Schmidt, night shift foreman at Utility Trailer, testified 
that when the trailer was brought into Utilityfs yard a tortion bar
 ( 
was out of place. 
It should be noted, as set forth in Appellant's Brief, the 
investigating officer did not see any tortion bar part way out of ( 
place when he examined the underside of the rig as it laid on its 
left side at the scene of the accident (Abs. 5, Tr. 43-44) and the 
rig was towed from the scene of the accident to Casper, Wyoming < 
and from Casper to Ogden, Utah, a total of approximately 450 miles, 
without anything being done to any tortion bar. 
Mr. Schmidt did not know when or where the accident in question i 
had occurred or what may have been done to the trailer in Bailey's 
yard at Ogden or Utility's yard at Salt Lake City before he worked 
on it (Abs. 58, Tr. 540-541). In fact, according to his testimony, < 
the trailer he was referring to could not have been the trailer 
in question. He stated he worked on the trailer he was referring 
to in April of 1967, that being about two months after he started * 
working for Utility on a full-time basis (Abs. 60, Tr. 458-459). 
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The accident in question occurred August 3, 1968 (Exh. 14). 
Respondent must be bound by the testimony of his own witness and 
such testimony is no stronger than left on cross-examination. 
Alvarado vs. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P.2d 986 (1954). 
Even if Mr. Schmidt's testimony were considered, what he 
observed after the trailer had been involved in a substantial 
impact wherein it traveled forty-eight feet through the air and 
then skidded over ninety feet on the ground, after which it was 
towed more than 450 miles with makeshift repairs before he observed 
it cannot be considered as evidence of the condition of the tortion 
bars before the impact and subsequent activity unless a foundation 
were laid by some expert to the effect that such impact and further 
movement of the vehicle would not have had an effect on the tortion 
bars. No such foundation was ever laid, or attempted. 
Regarding the broken frame bracket, respondent at page 14 of 
its Brief contends that the undercarriage of the trailer was not 
severely damaged and, therefore, it is not as likely that the frame 
bracket broke in the impact as before the impact. Again, this is 
contrary to the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses. Robert Lee 
Wareham, shop foreman at Utility Trailer at the time the trailer 
in question was brought in for repairs, testified that in addition 
to the frame bracket being broken, which he testified was broken 
in the accident (Abs. 10, Tr. 80), two of the four air bags were 
ruptured, (Abs. 8, Tr. 62) and a number of the cross-members of 
the trailer floor were broken (Abs. 10, Tr. 78). Also, the "U" 
bolts holding the axle were twisted (Abs. 58, Tr. 449) and the 
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two large equalizer beams were replaced (Tr. 89). 
Considering the very severe nature of the accident and impact, ( 
and the great amount of damage done to the undercarriage of the 
trailer, it would be impossible for a jury to rationally find from 
a preponderance of the evidence that one particular item, as con- i 
trasted to other items, was damaged before the impact rather than 
in the impact. 
( 
POINT II. 
THE TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF1S EXPERT 
WAS MERELY SCIENTIFIC SPECULATION 
Respondents position at page 18 of his Brief is inconsistent 
with the facts of this case. He says that if the photos, which 
were the only items of evidence available for Mr. Wildey to examine 
(Tr. 252), do not show a tortion bar partially out of place after 
the accident, such is not necessary because the loud bang heard by 
plaintiff and his sons was one of the frame brackets breaking, 
causing the trailer to go out of control and forced the tractor 
off the roadway. 
If the frame bracket broke on the left side, as Mr. Wildey 
i 
thought most likely (Tr. 252), the left duals would hang back, 
and still being on the hardtop (Exh. 14), would leave a consider-
able amount of scuff marks. However, such a hypothesis is not 
supportable in the evidence since the rig did travel a consider-
able distance down the road with its right duals off the road and 
its left duals on the hardtop without leaving a single scuff mark 
(Exfr. 15) . 
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On the other hand# if a right frame bracket broke, the duals 
on the right side would hang back causing the front of the trailer 
to move to the right and thereby push the rear of the tractor at 
the fifth wheel to the right causing its front end to go off to 
the left and the right duals would leave scuff marks on the road-
way as the rig traveled across the roadway to the left. However, 
this did not occur since the undisputed facts are that the first 
movement of the rig was to the right, with the right wheels going 
off the right edge of the roadway approximately four feet. 
Respondent's argument at pages 21 to 23 of his Brief that Mr. 
Wildeyfs explanation of which frame bracket broke is immaterial 
since he is only talking about which side "gave way" and not what 
gave way and caused the accident is specious, since until a frame 
bracket broke, there was nothing to cause one set of duals to go 
out of alignment and cause the ground-induced steering which is 
the essence of Mr. Wildey's opinion. Mr. Wildey testified: 
Q. Would you state that opinion to us. 
A. Yes. The effect was that of ground-induced steering by the 
trailer, which would take charge of the tractor, forcing it off 
the road. 
Q. Would you explain to us now your term "ground-induced steering"? 
A. Well, this arises from malalignment or misalignment of the 
axles, so that in effect they tend to turn in a radius. (Tr. 232). 
* * * 
A. . . . The vibration induced could possibly in my opinion very 
likely have allowed the bar to drift out of perhaps one side or 
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perhaps both sides and left the bracket — 
Q. Mr. Wildey, how could the bar drift out of both sides at the ( 
same time? 
A. Well, because — it wouldn't be drifting out of opposite sides. 
It would be drifting out of one side or the other. It would either ' 
go left, or it could go right. 
Q. I see. 
A. This would then leave this on the chassis, and there would be { 
a tendency for the whole axle to go out of alignment with its mate, 
or the forward axle, or in the case of the forward axle, the rear 
axle. Now, when that happens, you can readily appreciate that all 
of your draft load or load which the trailer is pulling the axle 
with is transferred to the opposite side bracket. 
Q. Which bracket are you referring to? 
A. The opposite frame bracket, which is over here. Now, that 
being the case, that's got to withstand perhaps some shock load. 
As this lets go and swings around, the whole axle swings. Then 
you are over stressing this bracket to some degree. Now I can't 
forecast what degree you would overload this bracket, but it might 
be sufficient to do exactly what we were told that it tore loose 
from the chassis. . . . (Tr. 242-243). 
The critical point in determining whether the accident was 
caused as contended by plaintiff's expert, i.e., the frame bracket 
breaking before the rig impacted, is that a tortion bar had to 
come part way out of the forks of the equalizer beam which hold 
it. If it cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence that 
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a tort ion bar did drift out prior to the impact, then there is 
no basis upon which the jury could find that the frame bracket 
broke prior to the accident thus causing the accident, rather 
than having been broken in the accident. Mr. Wildey admits that 
the photographs are the only evidence available to him to deter-
mine whether or not a tortion bar did in fact drift out of its 
brackets prior to the accident and that the photographs do not 
show such a condition (Abs. 36, Tr. 255). Since the photographs 
do not show the tortion bars being either in or out of their 
respective brackets, the jury would have to speculate upon 
whether or not one of them was in fact out prior to the accident 
and such is not legally permissible for making a finding of a 
fact necessary to the opinion of the expert, Mr. Wildey, without 
which there is no evidence upon which the cause of the accident 
could be found to be a condition for which the defendants are 
liable. 
POINT III. 
THE TIRES ADMITTED WERE PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE 
Appellant's position and reasons therefor regarding the 
inadmissibility of Exhibits 22 and 23 (tires) is adequately set 
forth under Point III of Appellant's Brief. 
However, in answer to respondent's argument that the tires 
were properly admitted to show negligent maintenance, it is 
elementary that evidence is admissible only if it is probative 
of a particular condition or circumstance in issue. Respondent's 
expert contended that the precipitating cause of the accident was 
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< 
a tortion bar drifting partially out of the forks of one of the 
equalizer beams (of which there is no evidence as set forth in 
the preceding point). Since the tires admitted into evidence 
were taken off the trailer before the tortion bars were repaired 
and their condition substantially improved (Abs. 21 & 22, Tr. 155 
& 156), they were not indicative of any condition existing at the 
time of the accident. 
To say that they are admissible to show a circumstance of 
failure to properly maintain the trailer at an earlier date with-
out showing that the condition of improper maintenance was the 
same at the time of the accident and, further, that it contributed 
to cause the accident is without merit. Since a proper foundation 
for their admission was not laid, the tires should not have been 
admitted. Because of their large size and the obvious "cupping11 
on their perimeters, they undoubtedly were very persuasive to the 
jury, which it must be presumed considered that they were indica-
tive of the condition of the trailer at the time of the accident 
since they were admitted by the Court over objection of counsel 
contending they were not. 
POINT IV. 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
JUDGMENT IN EXCESS OF HIS PRAYER 
On page 36 of Respondent's Brief, respondent contends that 
Smith vs. Tang, 412 P.2d 697 (Ariz. 1966), cited by appellant 
does not state the law of Arizona with respect to verdicts in 
excess of the prayer, and contends that Bechtel vs. Benson, 385 
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P.2d 225 (Ariz. 1963) does so state the law on this point in the 
state of Arizona. 
First of all, it should be noted that Smith vs. Tang was 
decided in 1966, three years later than Bechtel vs. Benson decided 
in 1963. 
The fact that Smith vs. Tang deals with a liquidated damage 
situation is not significant since the language of the court is 
very clear as to the reasons for its holding. At page 701, the 
court sets forth the premise for its position in stating: 
"We do not believe it is proper to permit a judgment on 
a verdict returned in excess of the amount of damages 
demanded by a party in his pleadings. The danger in per-
mitting an excessive verdict is to allow verdicts that 
spring from passion or prejudice rather than sufficiency 
of proof." 
The court then pointed out that merely because the verdict was 
excessive, it did not require a new trial since the appellate 
court could modify the judgment as the trial court should have 
done. At page 702, the court explained: 
"The damages assessed by the jury were not excessive in 
a degree necessary to imply the influence of passion or 
prejudice. The verdict was $1,228.14 in excess of the 
amount sought by plaintiff and this does not indicate 
the verdict resulted from prejudice. The excess verdict 
was not a nullity as such, but did show the unequivocal 
intention of the jury to award the plaintiff the full 
amount she asked. The evidence of the case was suffi-
cient to warrant a verdict for the amount claimed. There 
is no reason why the party should be subjected to a new 
trial. We, therefore, order the judgment modified to 
reduce the award in the amount of $1,228.14." 
Thus, it appears that the law of Arizona is to the effect 
that if the evidence supports the amount claimed and the verdict 
is not so excessive as to indicate passion or prejudice, the trial 
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< 
court should merely reduce the verdict to the amount demanded. 
Regarding the public policy question, it is true that the 
Utah Legislature removed the ad damnum clause in medical mal-
practice complaints. This was done for a very specific public 
policy reason and only effects a small, affluent and highly 
sophisticated segment of the population who can well determine 
whether or not they need private counsel to represent them in 
claims made against them. 
The public policy reason for removal of the ad damnum clause 
in malpractice cases does not carry over to all other litigation 
and, in fact, would be contrary to the best interest of the public 
at large for the reasons set forth under Point IV of Appellant's 
Brief. 
POINT V. 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DENTED PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE 
With respect to Point V of Respondent's Brief, respondent 
did not cross-appeal in this action and, therefore, his only 
prerogative is to respond to the points raised on appeal by 
appellant. Plaintiff's requested instruction 16-A was properly 
denied since the question of whether or not plaintiff was an 
employee of defendant Bailey's Moving and Storage Company and 
Allied Van Lines was not an issue in the case and was not tried. 
For plaintiff to attempt to inject it at this state of the pro-
ceedings is nothing more than an improper attempt to place 
inadmissible evidence before this Court. 
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The remaining points raised in Respondent's Brief do not 
justify further argument and are fully treated in Appellant's 
Brief. 
SUMMARY 
Respondent has alleged in his Brief that appellantfs State-
ment of Facts was not accurate, but did not attempt to show in 
what respect they were not accurate. He has further attempted 
to obviate the need of showing specific evidence from which the 
jury could have found by a preponderance of the evidence that a 
defect caused the accident in question by alleging a general 
"failure to maintain" the trailer in question during a time period 
prior to when repairs were made to the torsion bars and prior to 
the accident in question. 
For the reasons set forth in Appellant's Brief, defendant 
Bailey's Moving and Storage Company prays that the judgments 
awarded against it be reversed, or, in the alternative, that 
defendant be awarded a new trial, or, in the further alternative, 
that defendant be awarded a remitter of $50,000.00 on the general 
damage award. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, WADSWORTH & RUSSON 
REX 
Attorney fordefendant and 
Appellant 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
_ n _ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I served two (2) copies of Reply Brief 
of Appellant Bailey's Moving and Storage Company upon Earl Jay 
Peck, Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent, 410 Newhouse Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 and that I mailed, postage prepaid, 
two (2) copies of said Brief to Richard L. Stine, Attorney for 
Defendant/Appellant Allied Van Lines, 2650 Washington Boulevard, 
#101, Ogden, Utah this 11th day of October, 1976. 
\judJj<^^. c M 
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